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Abstract 
The principal objective of this paper is to analyze the common and country-specific aspects in 
the macroeconomic and political background of the poor public listing in Czechia and Hungary.  
Vector Autoregressions were tested on country level and a fixed effect panel regression 
analyzed the cross-country phenomena. As a key result, we cannot support the idea that 
privatization policies, funded pension pillar, economic crisis or stock market ownership could 
be useful variable which describes the solution of current situation. Believing that economic 
growth or the increasing number of companies can solve this problem proved to be also a false 
hope. Deeper and finer political and market incentives are necessary to highlight the added 
value of public listing for the targeted sector. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The number of public listed companies decreased significantly since the middle of the nineties 
not only on developed markets Doidge et al. (2015), but both in Czechia and Hungary as well 
– presenting a negative attitude towards direct funding channels. The scope of the paper is to 
decide, which macroeconomic conditions affected public listing in the selected sample 
countries. A number of policy decisions mitigated constraints or enhanced the potential of 
equity capital market financing for companies in the region. Privatization trough IPOs increased 
the number of companies on stock markets in the early nineties; however sample governments 
had no clear commitment towards this privatization channel. Funded pension pillars provide a 
stable demand both for bonds and shares with long term investment horizon. Stock markets 
started to join to conglomerates, providing a more standardized way of listing and services. 
However, stock markets suffered from crises as well both from financial and institutional point 
of view (for example the reporting frauds before the dot-com crisis). 
Present paper focuses on the Czech and Hungarian markets (due to their common historical 
background and similar stock market size) between 1996 and 2015, studying the impact of 
macro-variables and policy-related dummies on the number of public listed enterprises. Can we 
blame the development pathways of these countries or the exchange rate (for example: the 
former popular FX based corporate lending), the crises, the privatization or the ownership 
structure of the stock market for the declining trend of public listing in both countries? Or 
completely different paths are followed by these countries and we are not able to compare them?  
The structure of the paper is the following: theoretical background section summarizes the 
importance of public listing and the story behind the policy-related dummies. Methods contain 
the description of Vector Autoregression Models (VAR) to summarize country-specific aspects 
of public listing developments and a fixed effect panel regression model, where individual 
effect test can show the poolability of sample countries. Results and data section summarizes 
the key findings of the individual analysis of the countries and their common points.    
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Companies are able to use equity and debt sources to maintain the asset side of their balance 
sheet. Financial markets provide an alternative channel to raise capital by collecting 
shareholders’ equity and bond issuance – meanwhile listing can be interpreted as a sign of 
transparency and reliability (Meluzin and Zinecker, 2014, 2015). Markets have an important 
benchmark function as well to give a picture about asset valuation, volatility and interest rates. 
However, poor tendencies are questioning the added value of public listing from corporate point 
of view. Unfortunately, there is a strong demand for equities on the investor side, with a capital 
export as a consequence of this unsatisfied demand (Fungacova and Hanousek, 2011).   
Central East European countries have a mixed capitalism model according to Farkas (2011) and 
Nyvltova (2008), where companies prefer indirect lending channels and mostly neglecting the 
direct ways of fund raising (Shellock 2016). Governments tried to motivate economic actors 
via taxation (discounted dividend taxes on public listed enterprises), by privatisation trough 
IPOs or with the establishment of the funded pension pillars – however this commitment was 
not consistent and many accommodating decisions were cancelled later or followed with an 
even hostile policy (like Hungarian transaction taxes).   
Central banks can also expand their transmission channels by replacing private financial 
activity (Lenza et al. 2010, Bagus and Schiml 2009): purchasing corporate bonds directly on 
primary and secondary markets as it happens since 2010 in the Euro Area  or in Japan . Japanese 
Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing represented a whole new level, when purchases 
of Exchange Traded Funds debuted in 2013. 
The relative weight of public listing can be represented by listing count per capita, following 
Doidge et al. (2015). Macroeconomic development can be captured by the changes of log 
GDP/capita in market prices (source: national statistical offices) and the number of firms per 
capita. Currency market developments are characterized by real effective exchange rate 
changes. However, there are some region-specific factors which can affect public listing, 
namely privatization, mandatory funded pension pillars, stock exchange conglomerates and 
crises as the next section summarizes.  
2.1 Policy-related dummies 
There was a listing peak in the early nineties due to mass privatization processes in transitional 
Central European countries (Bornstein 1997). Voucher-privatization in Czechia resulted more 
than thousand listed companies on Prague Stock exchange until 1997 (Svejnar 2013) with a 
constant consolidation until 2002-2015 period when this number became two digit (Fungacova 
and Hanousek 2011). Hungarian governments preferred the non-public channels of 
privatization, a small number of companies were introduced on the market after an IPO and 
some of them was even delisted later. According to OECD (2006) Economic Survey, both 
countries have a very small venture capital market, moreover one of the lowest levels of venture 
capital investment in international comparison, when measured relative to GDP. This fact 
contraindicates with the access to financing, which is one of the key constraints for innovative 
SMEs – and without venture capital exits, the potential IPO number will be lower as well 
(Meluzin 2009). 
Pension system theoretically can be divided on four pillars: zero pillar provides social aid for 
old aged people from tax incomes, while first pillar covers the pay-as-you-go systems, where 
pension payments are provided from pension contribution – with a support from the public 
budget if it is necessary. Funded pillars can be mandatory (second) or volunteer (third) or can 
be based on individual savings without any kind of institutional background (fourth). The 
quality of these pillars depends on contributions in the past, income accruing from the 
investment in the future, and managerial costs and fees during the accumulation period – 
besides demographic and labor market conditions (Simonovits 2002).        
The first systemic pension reform in Central and Eastern Europe was approved in Hungary in 
1997 with the introduction of a privately-managed mandatory pension funds (MPF) as second 
pillar. MPF assets had increased to 9,7 percent of GDP in 2006, while third pillar (operating 
since 1993) was able to accumulate 2.6 percent of GDP. Returns of mandatory funded pillar 
followed the MNB base rate – partially due to the conservative bond-oriented investment 
strategies and high transactional costs (PSZÁF 2008, Czajlik and Szalay 2006).The 
modification of the government edict 282/2001 with the introduction of eligible portfolios in 
2006 increased the weight of equities to 40% and holding of venture fund units were allowed 
with 3% or 5% share. After these regulatory changes, government bonds remained as a 
dominant component in the portfolio (51%), while shares and investment funds had an 
increasing role (33%) at the end of 2007 (Gaál 2007, Impavido and Rocha 2006). However, the 
entire second pillar was nationalized and used up to finance public budget in 2010. Czechia has 
a short liaison with second pillar between 2012 and 2015 only, and the second pension pillar 
was officially cancelled as of 1 January 2016 by the Act 376/2015, which came from the results 
of the Professional Committee for Pension System Reform. (CSSZ, 2016). 
Czech and Hungarian stock markets were owned by local financial institutions until the first 
half of 2000s, when they were acquired by the Wiener Börse to form the CEESE Group 
(CEESEG). 
Trust in financial markets can be eroded under crises: willingness of IPOs decreases due to poor 
funding environment, while investors can reallocate their capital after corporate scandals. 
Sample markets were affected by the Russian crisis in 1998 (some blue chips like Richter had 
a significant market share in Russia), dot-com bubble between 2000-2002, sub-prime crisis in 
2007 and 2008. These periods were defined as crisis periods in the Euro-zone1, to define 
external funding and market conditions. 
3 METHODS 
Czech and Hungarian data was tested individually with a VAR model, then together via panel 
regression to see their common characteristics.  
Vector autoregressive (VAR) processes can describe the data generation process of a small set 
of time series variables, where all of them are treated as being a priori endogenous, and 
allowance is made for rich dynamics. This procedure captures the dynamic interactions for a 
set of K time series variables 𝑦𝑡 = (𝑦1𝑡, … , 𝑦𝐾𝑡)′. The basic model of order p VAR has the form 
of (1) (Lütkepohl and Kratzig, 2004).  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡      (1) 
Where the 𝐴𝑖’s are (KxK) coefficient matrices and 𝑢𝑡 = (𝑢1𝑡, … , 𝑢𝐾𝑡)′ is an unobservable error 
term, assumed to be a zero-mean independent white noise process with a time-invariant, 
positive definite covariance matrix: 𝑢𝑡  ~ (0, 𝐸(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑡
′)). The lack of autocorrelation in the 
residuals was tested with Ljung-Box test. 
Panel regression requires consistent, balanced and fixed database to group (individual-specific) 
effects, time effects, to manage heterogeneity that can or cannot be observed (Park 2011). Our 
paper uses Panel Data Toolbox2, following Álvarez, Barbero and Zofio (2015). Panel data (2) 
contains data matrices (with i columns and t rows) that were observed over a long period of 
time with y dependent and X independent variables with the following representation: 
                                                 
1 http://cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee  
2 http://www.paneldatatoolbox.com  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, i=1,…, n, t=1,…, 𝑇𝑖.     (2) 
where 𝜇𝑖 represents the i-th invariant time individual effect (or unobserved component, latent 
variable, and unobserved heterogeneity) and 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑(0, 𝜃𝑣
2) refers to the disturbance. In panel 
data models 𝜇𝑖 is called as a ‘‘random effect’’ when it is assumed as a random variable and a 
‘‘fixed effect’’ when it is treated as a parameter to be estimated for each cross section 
observation i. It means that fixed effect approach allows arbitrary correlation between the 
unobserved effect 𝜇𝑖 and the observed explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Fixed effects analysis is more 
robust than random effects analysis, but time-constant factors cannot be included as 𝑋𝑖𝑡 – this 
approach is for time-varying explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2010). 
The Im and Pesaran (2003) panel unit root test (3) assumes the cross-sectional independence, 
with individual effects and no time trend:  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑧∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑧 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖
𝑧=1         (3) 
Null hypothesis: 𝜌𝑖=0 for all i=1,…,N and alternative hypothesis is 𝜌𝑖<0 for i=1,…,𝑁1 and 
𝜌𝑖 =0 for i=𝑁1+1,…,N, with 0<𝑁1 ≤N alternative hypothesis allows for some (but not all) of 
the individual series to have unit roots. This test uses separate unit root tests for each cross-
section units based on the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller statistics averaged across groups. (Hurlin 
– Valérie 2007). 
Serial correlation in the error term biases the standard errors and causes loss of efficiency. 
Wooldridge’s test (4) has a null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error term of a fixed 
effects model, time demeaned errors of a within regression are negative serially correlated: 𝜌 =
−1/(𝑇 − 1). This test regresses within 𝑣𝑖𝑡 estimation residuals over their lag, 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 using a 
Wald test with clustered standard errors: 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡         (4) 
Random effects models can be tested by Baltagi and Li's Lagrange multiplier test for first-order 
serially correlated errors with the joint null hypothesis of serial correlated and random 
individual effects. The LM test is based on the OLS residuals and it is asymptotically distributed 
as a Χ2
2. 
4 RESULTS AND DATA 
This section summarizes the key information about the dataset, then the two countries are 
analyzed separately to identify country-specific aspects. Later the common points are 
highlighted by a panel regression.   
Czech company number per capita ratio was lower during the entire sample as Fig. 1 presents, 
but both of them presented a continuous increase – while listed per capita ratio suffered from 
continuous decrease. Hungarian listing remained stable, compared the monotone decrease in 
the Czech case. First years were characterized with privatization only, while crises were defined 
for the following intervals: 1998, 2000-2002, 2008-2009, 2011-2013 (as they appeared in the 
Euro-zone as the main export market of both countries). 
 
Fig. 1 – Listing, company number and dummies. Source: own edition, stock markets, 
Hungarian and Czech statistical offices 
Hungarian listing has a declining behavior (Tab.1), represented by the negative coefficient of 
the 2 year lagged data. Funding of new companies can have a minor positive impact on the 
listing. Previous real effective exchange rate changes can have significant negative impact (it 
can be interpreted as the result of the popularity of FX based corporate lending), however their 
coefficient was close to zero. Crisis in the Euro-zone, privatization and funded second pillar 
had significant impact on listing, while the ownership-structure had no significance. 
 
Tab. 1 – Vector Autoregressive Model on Hungarian yearly data (1996-2015) with 2 lag. 
Source: own edition, JPL Toolbox for Matlab 
 
Dependent Variable = listed/capita      
R-squared     =    0.9970  
Rbar-squared  =    0.9879  
sige          =    0.0000  
Q-statistic   =    3.0603  
Nobs, Nvars   =     17,    13  
****************************************************************** 
Variable   Coefficient t-statistic t-probability  
listed/capita      lag1  0.291447 1.868912 0.135001  
listed/capita      lag2  -0.278103 -2.561490 0.062539*  
lgdp/capita        lag1  -0.000000 -0.206781 0.846280  
lgdp/capita        lag2  -0.000000 -0.197827 0.852827  
company no/capita  lag1 0.000002 0.661917 0.544212  
company no/capita  lag2 0.000029 5.753354 0.004526***  
dREER              lag1  -0.000000 -0.927630 0.406105  
dREER              lag2  -0.000000 -4.768462 0.008850*  
Crisis d   0.000000 2.995355 0.040125**  
Privatisation d   -0.000000 -2.657131 0.056559*  
2nd pillar d   -0.000001 -7.961110 0.001349***  






























































































mandatory funded pension pillar HU CEESEG
Privatizations CZ mandatory funded pension pillar CZ
company no/capita HU company no/capita CZ
listed/capita HU listed/capita CZ
constant   0.000011 3.918019 0.017277** 
Notes: ***: significant at 99%, **: significant at 95%, *: significant at 90% 
Ljung-Box test on residuals (lag 2): p(1)=0.24, p(2)=0.26 
 
Variable set was not significant for the Czech market, only the 2 year memory was present in 
listing per capita (Tab. 2). This result suggests that poor listing has different macro background 
in both countries. 
Tab. 2 – Vector Autoregressive Model on Czech yearly data (1996-2015) with 2 lag. Source: 
own edition, JPL Toolbox for Matlab 
 
Dependent Variable = listed/capita      
R-squared     =    0.9986  
Rbar-squared  =    0.9954  
sige          =    0.0000  
Q-statistic   =    2.2924  
Nobs, Nvars   =     17,    12  
****************************************************************** 
Variable                       Coefficient t-statistic t-probability  
listed/capita      lag1  -0.093857 -0.347920 0.742069  
listed/capita      lag2  0.562524 2.796539 0.038149**  
logGDP/capita lag1  -0.000008 -1.438245 0.209884  
logGDP/capita lag2  0.000008 1.228310 0.273990  
company no/capita  lag1 -0.000745 -1.814031 0.129399  
company no/capita  lag2 0.000007 0.043852 0.966720  
dREER              lag1  0.000000 1.591701 0.172328  
dREER              lag2  -0.000000 -0.623466 0.560313  
Crisis dummy   0.000000 0.687657 0.522261  
2nd pillar dummy  0.000000 0.486530 0.647167  
CEESEG dummy  0.000001 1.069217 0.333850  
constant   0.000013 0.426582 0.687427 
Notes: ***: significant at 99%, **: significant at 95%, *: significant at 90% 
Ljung-Box test on residuals (lag 2): p(1)=0.28, p(2)=0.30 
 
To test the common points between Czechia and Hungary, a fixed effects panel regression was 
fitted on the data. It indicated that log GDP per capita and privatization were significant 
variables, with negative coefficients (so there is no reason to say that poor listing can be grown 
out, or privatization can be a sole solution). Both countries were significant at the test of 
individual effects, making the sample structure reasonable, while the input table had no unit 
root and the panel provided non autocorrelated residuals (Tab. 3). 
 
Tab. 3 – Panel: Fixed effects (within) (FE) on Czech and Hungarian data. Source: own 
edition, Panel Data Toolbox for Matlab 
 
Dependent Variable = listed/capita      
N = 40  n = 2  T = 20 (Balanced panel) 
R-squared = 0.31250    Adj R-squared = 0.13508  
Wald F(7, 31) = 2.013014 p-value = 0.0852  
RSS = 0.000000 ESS = 0.000000 TSS = 0.000000  
variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-stat  p-value 
logGDP/capita | -0.000072 0.000022 -3.2093 0.003 *** 
company no/capita | 0.000581 0.000399 1.4535  0.156  
dREER |  0.000001 0.000001 1.4288  0.163  
Crisis dummy | -0.000010 0.000008 -1.3317 0.193  
Privatisation dummy | -0.000038 0.000018 -2.1520 0.039 **  
2nd pillar dummy | 0.000004 0.000011 0.4171  0.679  
CEESEG dummy | 0.000006 0.000013 0.4927  0.626  
Individual Effects  
id  |  ieffect  Std. Error t-stat p-value 
Czechia | 0.000905 0.000274 3.3013 0.002 *** 
Hungary | 0.000974 0.000295 3.3050 0.002 *** 
Wooldridge's test for serial correlation p-value = 0.3133 
Im and Pesaran (2003) Panel Unit Root Test  
P-value of the W_bar statistic = 0.0318** 
P-value of the Z_bar statistic = 0.0326** 
P-value of the Z_bar_DF statistic = 0.0000*** 
Notes: ***: significant at 99%, **: significant at 95%, *: significant at 90% 
5 CONCLUSION 
There are different myths and ideas about the poor level of public listing in Czechia and 
Hungary. Current paper tested the possible macroeconomic and political determinants to check, 
how privatisation, pension system, crisis and stock market ownership background affected 
corporate attendance on local equity markets. Economic development was involved via the 
inclusion of GDP and general corporate number. There were significant differences between 
Czechia and Hungary as individual VAR models suggested, however none of the variables were 
identified as a super weapon candidate which can be used to change the tide. Our results are 
suggesting that the decreasing number of public listing is not an issue what can be outgrow, or 
not even a problem what can be sustainably managed through future privatisations. Despite the 
different development paths since the transition, the individual effects in the panel regressions 
supported the idea to involve both countries in the sample.  
Poor venture capital involvement remained an unsettled issue in our dataset, because of the 
small and mixed portfolio of such companies. Listing costs were non transparent, while private 
sector profitability would be biased by many factors so they were excluded from our research. 
The main theoretical implication of this study is that we cannot interpret poor public listing 
with macro or political variables only, this agenda requires a more sophisticated and structural 
approach to find those key factors which can highlight the added value of stock markets for 
companies. 
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